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Tertullian’s famous question ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’ 
concerns the relationship between theology (Jerusalem) and philosophy 
(Athens). Regardless of answer, the question assumes some distinction 
between the two. Developments in modern philosophy, however, have 
complicated this assumption. Some philosophers of religion, for instance, 
have used their philosophical training to answer explicitly theological 
questions, 1 and the rise of ‘analytic theology’ is equally explicit about its 
desire to adopt philosophical tools for the theological task.2  
A more pressing question, then, is not what Athens has to do with 
Jerusalem, but do the sprawling cities overlap such that they are no longer 
necessarily distinct?  
One might wonder at the outset why this question matters – does it 
matter whether a particular work is called ‘philosophy’, ‘theology’, 
‘philosophy of religion’, ‘philosophical theology’, or anything else? What 
is at stake, however, is whether the discipline of theology has anything 
unique to offer or whether it is rendered superfluous. The aim of this paper 
is to show how theology is distinct from philosophy of religion.  
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Words about God and loving wisdom: Defining theology and 
philosophy 
 
In order to distinguish the disciplines of theology and philosophy, initial 
definitions must be offered. History or etymology can be guides but are 
ultimately insufficient to provide helpful definitions.3 If philosophy is the 
love (philo) of wisdom (sophia), then anyone who loves wisdom is a 
philosopher. Similarly, if theology is simply words (logos) about God 
(Theos), then most human beings are theologians. This might correctly 
describe the kind of activity germane to each, but as definitions of a 
discipline they are too broad. On the other hand, defining theology or 
philosophy only as academic disciplines would be too narrow. ‘Armchair 
philosophers’ or ‘armchair theologians’ are those with an interest in the 
respective discipline without any academic training.4 Good definitions of 
philosophy and theology will be sufficiently broad enough to include 
practitioners inside and outside the academy but sufficiently narrow 
enough to be helpfully descriptive and not include all who ‘love wisdom’ 
or ‘speak about God’. 
What is philosophy? Keith Yandell is right that there is no such thing 
as a ‘noncontroversial answer’ to this question.5 He defines it as ‘the 
enterprise of constructing and assessing categorical systems.’6 This 
suggests that philosophy, broadly understood, is best defined by its 
methodology, or how it operates, rather than its object of study as most 
other disciplines do (e.g. ‘biology’ is the study of living things). William 
Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland call philosophy a ‘second-order discipline’ 
for this reason. A first-order discipline studies particular objects, but a 
second-order discipline studies other fields or disciplines.7 Eleonore 
Stump argues that philosophy does seek something in particular (wisdom), 
but is distinct because what it seeks is not a concrete object but ‘an abstract 
universal.’8  
Understood in this way, philosophy and theology are not identical since 
theology is, in some way, indexed to the study of God.9 However, 
philosophy of religion is a sub-discipline of philosophy indexed to 
religious claims and practices. Yandell says it offers ‘philosophically 
accessible accounts of religious traditions and assessing those traditions’.10 
Charles Taliaferro defines it as ‘the philosophical examination of the 
themes and concepts involved in religious traditions’ including 
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‘alternative concepts of God or ultimate reality’.11 The challenge, then, 
will be distinguishing theology from philosophy of religion.  
What is theology? Like philosophy, there is no such thing as 
noncontroversial answer to this. By ‘theology’, I mean distinctly Christian 
theology. Andrew Torrance argues that theology in the Christian tradition 
is marked by a ‘commitment to being “scientific.”’12 This ‘refers to 
theology as an endeavor to understand a mind-independent object in a way 
that is true to the nature of that object.’13 For him ‘the task of theology 
should be characterized as a commitment to understanding God and all 
things in relation to God (GATRG) in a way that is accountable to the true 
nature of GATRG […] and takes into account God’s self-disclosure.’14 
Torrance ‘follows Aquinas’ in this understanding of theology as science. 
Of Aquinas’ view Gerald Loughlin says:  
 
For Aquinas, sacred doctrine [i.e. theology] is ‘science’ 
(knowledge), the principles of which are […] received in faith from 
a superior knowledge, ‘namely God’s very own which he shares 
with the blessed’ […] given to us in the scriptural revelation 
through the tradition of the church15 
 
In what follows, I adopt a scientific understanding of theology.16  
There are at least four features which mark the task of theology. First, 
theology is the study of God, a mind-independent person. Stump contrasts 
philosophy, which seeks the abstract universal ‘wisdom’, with theology, 
which seeks a person ‘characterized by mind and will’ who ‘cannot be 
construed as an abstract universal.’17 Second, theology depends on God’s 
self-disclosure.18 It is ‘received in faith from a superior knowledge,’ the 
principles of which cannot be derived without revelation. It, adds 
Torrance, ‘is bound up with God’s historical self-disclosure in the 
spatiotemporal order.’19 Likewise, Thomas McCall says theology is the 
attempt to articulate ‘what we may know of God as God has revealed 
himself to us.’20 Third, the context of theology is Scripture and the church. 
The revelation on which theology depends is ‘given to us in the scriptural 
revelation through the tradition of the church.’ Although made possible by 
God, theology is a human task and occurs within this particular context. 
Fourth, theology is performed in faith. It must be ‘received in faith’. 
Torrance argues that ‘without the condition that is described as “faith”’ the 
theologian ‘has no recognition of GATRG.’21  
 
How a faith-methodology distinguishes theology from philosophy 
 
28 
A faith-methodology: Distinguishing between theology and philosophy 
of religion 
 
Using the definitions above, theology and philosophy of religion cannot 
be called identical. It is easy to distinguish philosophy of religion from 
theology. A systematic account of Buddhism, for instance, could be an 
example of philosophy of religion but not theology. However, 
distinguishing theology from philosophy of religion is more difficult. 
What is needed is some feature or characteristic that could be ascribed to 
theology but, necessarily, not to philosophy of religion. In this section I 
analyze three ways to distinguish theology from philosophy of religion 
before suggesting a fourth as a better way forward.  
The first way to distinguish theology from philosophy is to argue that 
theology is a science and philosophy of religion is not. Torrance, for 
instance, argues that theology’s object is ‘mind-independent,’ but 
philosophy of religion is ‘mind-dependent’ and reducible to ‘human 
thoughts about GATRG.’22 Jonathan Rutledge, however, doubts whether 
this approach is sufficient since philosophy too can be defined as a 
science.23 He says philosophy ‘centrally involves some form of conceptual 
analysis’ that includes concepts and propositions which, most 
philosophers agree, are mind-independent. Rutledge thinks Torrance’s 
understanding of philosophy as necessarily mind-dependent demonstrates 
‘a fundamental misunderstanding of what philosophy is.’ Since 
philosophy includes, for Rutledge, ‘investigating mind-independent 
objects’,24 then it can count as a science in Torrance’s definition.  
A second way to distinguish theology from philosophy of religion is to 
argue that the referent in each is different. This can take at least two forms. 
First, one might argue that the conception of ‘God’ used in philosophy of 
religion is different than the conception of theology. Theology requires 
one ‘not merely to say things about God (or God-and-everything) – it is to 
speak truly of God (so far as we can).’25 This requires, adds Torrance, ‘the 
revelatory activity of God’ without which ‘a person cannot know the triune 
God and, therefore, cannot know the one to whom theological words 
refer’.26 In this form, the philosopher of religion might attempt to speak 
about God but fails to do. Second, one might argue that the referents are 
different kinds of things. Rutledge, for instance, recognizes that the 
concepts and propositions used in philosophy of religion are not the same 
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thing as ‘God’ because they are not a person. Theology refers to a person 
while philosophy of religion does not. Stump takes a similar view:  
 
[…] the difference between theology and philosophy lies most 
centrally in this difference in what they seek. It makes a great 
difference to one’s method of seeking and one’s view of the nature 
of depth-in-understanding whether what one is seeking is an 
abstract universal such as wisdom or something with a mind and a 
will.27 
 
Philosophers of religion trade in concepts and ideas while theologians, first 
and foremost, study a person. 
The third way to distinguish theology and philosophy of religion, 
similar to the second form of the second way, is based on their 
‘epistemological orientation.’28 Stump argues that theology helps ‘connect 
human persons to the person of God and to gain comprehension of him.’29 
Theology and philosophy, then, incorporate different ways of knowing; 
philosophy aims for knowledge that while theology aims for personal 
knowledge.30 The basic orientation of each, says Stump, is distinct ‘in 
terms of the kind of epistemology each needs to pursue its aims’.31 
Similarly, Rutledge says that personal knowledge is ‘exclusive and 
fundamental to the practice of theology.’32  
These ways have much to commend, yet there remain intuitive 
problems.33 The first way fails to offer a definition of science which 
excludes philosophy of religion. The second way says that the referent for 
each discipline is different, but it is difficult to see why this need be the 
case. The philosopher of religion, regardless of faith commitment, might 
refer to an all-powerful, perfectly loving person who created everything.34 
This, at least initially, appears to refer to the same person of Christian 
theology even if there remain significant differences. Moreover, why can 
the Christian philosopher of religion not, qua philosopher of religion, refer 
to the Triune God of Christianity in her work? The third way would require 
any work using concepts and propositions about the nature of God to be 
philosophy of religion and theology to be non-propositional. Theology, 
however, as a human task of speaking about God does use propositions 
and, without propositions, it would be difficult to consider it an academic 
discipline. These are not intended to be defeaters, but they are, to my mind, 
intuitive weaknesses of each way.  
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The fourth way to distinguish theology from philosophy of religion 
avoids these weaknesses. Theology can distinguish itself not principally in 
what kind of task it is (a science), nor in its object of study (God), nor in 
its kind of knowing (personal), but instead in how it is performed. The 
fourth feature of scientific theology is particularly important: theology is 
performed in faith. This could be understood as merely engaging discipline 
while having faith, but I understand it as something more fundamental to 
the task. Theology, unlike other disciplines including philosophy of 
religion, adopts a faith-methodology. A methodology is the mode of 
operation for a discipline; it is the structure or system that one operates 
within. Faith, for the Christian theologian, is characterized by a trust or 
allegiance to the Father known in Jesus Christ by the power of the Spirit. 
A faith-methodology, then, is a mode of operation whereby faith 
determines the practices and context of the discipline and is not merely 
incidental to it.  
To clarify this further, we can see how a faith-methodology manifests 
itself in at least two ways. First, a faith-methodology manifests itself by 
inhabiting what John Webster calls ‘a Christian culture.’35 For Webster, ‘a 
culture is a space or region made up of human activities. It is a set of 
intentional patterns of human action which have sufficient coherence, 
scope, and duration to constitute a way of life.’36 By inhabiting a particular 
culture, theology remains, to some degree, a human task. In the third way 
of distinction, Stump and Rutledge are both correct to conclude that the 
task of theology is not reducible to propositional content. It is, as the study 
of a person, necessarily personal. Yet it continues to participate within a 
human culture and, therefore, continues to use human language (i.e. 
propositions) to describe God.37 Theology adopting a faith-methodology 
remains, then, academically appropriate. 
Theology, however, inhabits not just any culture but a distinctly 
Christian one. That is, a culture ‘which seeks somehow to inhabit the world 
which is brought into being by the staggering good news of Jesus Christ’.38 
It cannot, then, be primarily conceived of as an academic discipline but an 
activity which is ‘characterized by a certain regional specificity’ – that of 
the church of Jesus Christ.39 Sarah Coakley, likewise, argues that theology 
is ‘a form of intellectual investigation’ but nonetheless a form ‘in which a 
secular, universalist rationality may find itself significantly challenged – 
whether criticized, expanded, transformed, or even at points rejected.’40 
Webster thus insists that the better question for the relationship of theology 
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and academy is not ‘what does theology need to become in order to fit into 
the academy?’ but rather ‘what does the academy need to become in order 
to profit from Christian theology?’41 Theology has an ecclesial vocation 
that is prior to, and more fundamental than, its academic vocation.  
The second way a faith-methodology manifests itself is in the habits 
and practices germane to the method. Since the task of theologian is 
primarily ecclesial, Webster argues that ‘being a Christian theologian 
involves the struggle to become a certain kind of person, one shaped by 
the culture of Christian faith’42; the theologian will be one continually 
disrupted.43 Coakley adds that ‘the task of theology is always, if implicitly, 
a recommendation for life. The vision it sets before one invites ongoing – 
and sometimes disorienting – response and change, both personal and 
political, in relation to God.’44 Unlike other disciplines, theology, insists 
Webster, ‘requires the cultivation not only of technical skills but also of 
habits of the soul.’45 This means that certain practices, or habits, are not 
incidental to task of theology, but fundamental to it. These practices 
include46 but are not limited to:  
 
• Prayer, in the sense that conversation with God in individual and 
communal prayer counts as reflection and engagement with God;47 
• Worship, in the sense that the liturgy of the church can contribute 
to a cognitive apprehension of God;48  
• Humility, in the sense that human language about God is 
subservient to the revelation of God;49 
• Submission to and engagement with Scripture and the church 
tradition, in the sense that the theologian perceives her task as 
within this particular tradition that is governed by particular norms 
and criteria for truth.50 
 
These practices, in the specific senses identified here, proceed from a faith-
methodology. They are fundamental to theology because they are the way 
one comes to know God. Sarah Coakley points out that ‘if one is resolutely 
not engaged in the practices of prayer, contemplation, and worship, then 
there are certain sorts of philosophical insight that are unlikely, if not 
impossible, to become available to one.’51 Without these practices 
theological practice is deficient if not impossible.  
It is of course true that practitioners of other disciplines might, for 
instance, pray while practising their discipline, but this is not a faith-
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methodology. In a faith-methodology, prayer can actually be a way the 
discipline is practised. This does not mean, however, that all of these 
practices, in the senses identified above, are always necessary for any 
theological work.52 The theologian may, for instance, produce a work of 
theology without showing how worship in the liturgy is contributing to 
that work, but she will recognize worship as appropriate, and even 
normative to some degree, in the task of theology. By adopting a faith-
methodology, the theologian practises her discipline in a way the 
philosopher of religion cannot.  
One objection53 to the faith-methodology as the distinguishing mark of 
theology is that the Christian philosopher of religion might adopt a faith-
methodology just like the theologian. Moreland and Craig, for instance, 
argue that ‘the task of the Christian philosopher of religion’ need not differ 
from the theologian ‘insofar as he philosophizes as a Christian’.54 It is true 
that the Christian philosopher of religion, or practitioners of other 
disciplines for that matter, might have a deep personal faith in Jesus Christ 
and find that faith relevant to her work. Her methodology, however, 
determines the discipline in which she engages. A philosophical 
methodology performed by a person of faith is not the same as a faith-
methodology. A philosopher can pray while practising philosophy, but the 
theologian prays in order to practise theology.55 If a practitioner adopts a 
faith-methodology to speak about God, then the better conclusion would 
be that she ceases to do philosophy of religion and, instead, performs 
theology. There is little reason to think, after all, that an academic trained 





Theology and philosophy, or philosophy of religion, have much in 
common. Both operate within the academy, and both use propositions to 
describe the nature of God. Moreover, the work of many modern 
philosophers and theologians have brought the disciplines closer together. 
Yet they remain distinct primarily in their methodology. Theology’s 
method is best characterized by a faith-methodology, a methodology 
which is determined by one’s faith in Jesus Christ. By adopting this 
methodology, theology proves distinct from all other academic disciplines, 
including philosophy of religion.  
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